Appellant, Columbus Giddings, appeals the district court's sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. Finding Appellant's sentence neither imposed in violation of law nor plainly unreasonable, we affirm.

In 1991, Appellant plead guilty to two counts, possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(a), and possession of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(a). Appellant was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of 18 and 12 months to be followed by 3 years of supervised release.

Approximately four months after Appellant began serving his period of supervised release, the United States moved to revoke Appellant's supervised release for violation of its conditions. The motion charged Appellant with 1) possessing and using a controlled substance on three occasions, 2) failing to appear for a random urinalysis test and a counseling session, and 3) failing to successfully complete an in-patient drug treatment program.

Appellant admitted the violations except the failure to appear for counseling. The district court specifically found that Appellant had possessed a controlled substance and therefore concluded that revocation of the Appellant's supervised release was mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g). The district court revoked Appellant's supervised release.

After consideration of the policy statements of Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the statutory minimum, the district court sentenced Appellant to 24 months of imprisonment. Appellant appeals the sentence on two grounds. First, Appellant contends that the policy statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the district court, and therefore that the imposition of the 24 month sentence constituted an unjustified upward departure. Next, Appellant asserts that the district court improperly considered Appellant's need for drug rehabilitation in arriving at the 24 month sentence.

"We will uphold a sentence unless it 1) was imposed in violation of law, 2) resulted from an incorrect application of the guidelines, 3) was outside the guideline range and is unreasonable, or 4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable." United States v. Headrick, 963 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir.1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)). Because there is no applicable guideline for sentencing after revocation of supervised release, we will uphold Appellant's sentence unless it is in violation of law or is plainly unreasonable. Id.

Appellant first contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court failed to sentence him to a term of imprisonment within the applicable range set forth in the "Revocation Table", U.S.S.G. Sec. 7B1.4, p.s. The "Revocation Table" recommends a sentence of five to eleven months based on Appellant's grade of violation and criminal history category.1 However, because the court determined that Appellant possessed a controlled substance, the court was required, at minimum, to impose a sentence of one-third of the term of the supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g). Section 3583(g) does not provide a maximum sentence.

Under the sentencing guidelines, if the minimum term of imprisonment required by the statute exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment under Sec. 7B1.4(a), then section 7B1.4(b)(2) provides that the statutory minimum shall be substituted for the applicable range. Accordingly, the sentence recommended by the policy statement was one year. To determine the maximum sentence permitted under Sec. 3583(g), the district court looked to Sec. 3583(e)(3) and determined, by analogy, that the maximum allowable sentence of imprisonment was 24 months. The district court concluded, therefore, that the applicable sentencing range was between 12 and 24 months. Based on its evaluation of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a), the court sentenced Appellant to 24 months of imprisonment.

In United States v. Headrick,2 we held that when a court sentences a defendant upon revocation of his supervised release under Sec. 3583(g), the policy statements of Chapter 7 are advisory only.3 In United States v. Mathena,4 we reaffirmed the holding of Headrick in the context of sentencing upon revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e)(3). In Mathena, we explained that the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Stinson v. United States,5 did not affect our holding in Headrick.6 Thus, the district court was not bound by the suggested sentencing range set forth in the policy statements of Chapter 7.

Appellant next contends that even if the district court was not bound by the Sentencing Guideline policy statements, the term of imprisonment imposed was in error because the district judge improperly considered Appellant's need for drug rehabilitation in determining the sentence.7

For purposes of an initial sentencing, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)8 sets out the relevant factors to be used by the district court to fashion a defendant's sentence. Although the district judge is required to review the Sec. 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence, the court has limited discretion in the factors it can use to determine whether to impose a term of imprisonment. Typically, a person's need for rehabilitation cannot be used to determine whether a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.9

In contrast, when initially determining the period of supervised release, the district court must consider the Sec. 3553(a) factors, therefore the defendant's need for rehabilitation10 is necessarily taken into account.11 If supervised release is subsequently revoked under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e), the statute also requires that the Sec. 3553(a) factors be considered. However, when revocation of supervised release is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g), the statute does not require consideration of the Sec. 3553(a) factors.

The issue before this court is whether a district court may properly consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs in determining the length of a sentence of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. The issue is one of first impression for this circuit. We do not, however, write on an entirely blank slate. The Second Circuit considered a similar issue in United States v. Anderson,12 and the majority concluded that an inquiry into the defendant's rehabilitative needs was permissible.

In Anderson, the Second Circuit was faced with a district court's revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e). Under Sec. 3583(e), imprisonment is one of several options that a district judge may employ to remedy a violation of supervised release. The court affirmed the district judge's revocation of supervised release, and upheld the imposition of a 17 month sentence13 based on the district judge's view that the defendant required "intensive substance abuse and psychological treatment in a structured environment."14 The Anderson majority reasoned that because the defendant's need for rehabilitation or medical care must be considered in fashioning the initial term of supervised release, a fortiori these factors may also be considered in fashioning a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.15

The issue before this Court arises in a context similar to that decided by the Second Circuit, but with an important distinction. While the Second Circuit was presented with a permissive revocation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(e), this Court is faced with a mandatory revocation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g). In the present situation, the district court did not determine whether revocation and imprisonment were warranted--the decision to revoke Appellant's supervised release and to impose a period of imprisonment was dictated by statute. Therefore, we need only decide whether the district court properly considered Appellant's rehabilitative needs in arriving at the length of sentence. We need not, and do not decide whether a district court may properly consider a defendant's rehabilitative needs in deciding whether, as an initial matter, imprisonment is warranted.

As explained above, the Sentencing Guidelines do not provide a binding sentencing range applicable to the revocation of supervised release. Therefore, the sentencing range is determined by statute. Title 18, Section 3582(g) of the United States Code provides a minimum sentence of 12 months--one-third of the initial period of supervised release--for the instant revocation. Assuming without deciding that the district court correctly adopted a maximum sentence of 24 months from 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3582(e)(3), the district court was faced with a sentencing range of 12 to 24 months.

This court has previously held that rehabilitative factors may be considered by a district court when determining where to sentence within a particular guideline range.

[T]he Sentencing Guidelines reject the rehabilitation model as a valid penological paradigm. The Guidelines recognize that the principal purpose of sentencing is punishment, creating sentencing ranges to effect this purpose. Even so, the Guidelines do not preclude consideration of a defendant's rehabilitative potential as a mitigating factor within an applicable range of punishment. Indeed, the Sentencing Guidelines expressly permit the district court to consider all relevant and permissible character traits of the defendant in assessing a sentence within a particular range.

United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 956 (5th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557 (9th Cir.1994).16 The legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 also indicates that the prohibition against considering rehabilitative needs relates to the decision of whether to impose imprisonment, not to the length of the term of imprisonment.17

This rationale is especially compelling in a revocation of supervised release context. When revoking supervised release the district judge is not resentencing the defendant. The type and the term of the sentence has already been determined by the sentencing judge. The supervising district judge is bound by the sentence previously imposed, and at revocation is merely converting all or a portion of the supervised release period into a term of imprisonment. Given the limited discretion available to the supervising district judge, and the fact that the sentencing range is fixed by statute, consideration of the Sec. 3553(a) factors may be appropriate to fashion a sentence conforming to the purpose and intent of the original sentence, and that is within the boundaries established by the sentencing judge.

In the instant case, the district court was not faced with the question of whether or not to sentence the Appellant to a term of imprisonment. Once the district court determined that Appellant violated his supervised release by possession of a controlled substance, revocation and imprisonment were mandatory. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g). The sentencing district judge, and the relevant statutes, established the sentencing range within which the supervising district judge had to impose sentence.

We now hold that the language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g), and the purposes and intent behind the statute, is best served by permitting a district judge to consider a defendant's need for rehabilitation in arriving at a specific sentence of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. While we do not decide whether rehabilitative needs can be used to determine whether to impose imprisonment as an initial matter, once imprisonment is mandated by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(g) rehabilitative needs may be considered to determine the length of incarceration within the sentencing range.

We also reject Appellant's contention that a sentence of two years imprisonment was plainly unreasonable.18 The district court was required to impose a sentence of at least twelve months pursuant to Sec. 3583(g). Unlike the permissive revocation provision of Sec. 3583(e)(3), the mandatory revocation provision of Sec. 3583(g) does not provide any maximum sentence. Appellant would be subject to a maximum sentence of 24 months under Sec. 3583(e)(3). It follows that imposing that same sentence under Sec. 3583(g) cannot be plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Headrick, 963 F.2d at 782-83.

For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED.